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Research summary: Limited attention has been paid to the crucial role of individuals’ motivation
and social interactions in capability development. Building on literature in social psychology and
behavioral economics that links heterogeneity in individual social motives to social interactions,
we explain how the variation, selection, and retention processes underlying a group’s deliberate
capability development are affected by the composition of the group in terms of individuals’ social
motives in interplay with the organizational-level motivational levers designed by managers. Our
multilevel theoretical model suggests that individual-level heterogeneity leads to the development
of capabilities along different paths. For practice, this implies that, according to the composition
of the group in terms of social motives, capabilities are more or less technically and evolutionary
adequate and a source of business process performance.
Managerial summary: We propose that when a group of employees engages in developing one
of the firm’s capabilities, capability development will follow a different path according to what
motivates most of the employees composing the group. We identify and discuss three paths. Two
of these paths (convergence and congruence) can help improve business process performance in
a stable environment, the third one (open-ended) in a dynamic environment. Our work invites
managers to not only think in terms of more or less capability development, but also in terms
of capability development path(s): the path(s) in which groups in the firm are currently engaged
and the one(s) that are desirable given the firm’s objectives and the nature of the environment(s)
the firm faces in deploying its business processes. © 2016 The Authors. Strategic Management
Journal published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
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INTRODUCTION
Understanding capability development is critical
to explaining heterogeneity in firm performance
(Gavetti, 2005; Zollo and Winter, 2002). For
example, Southwest Airlines outperformed com-
petitors over a long period of time, not because
1756 F. Bridoux, R. Coeurderoy, and R. Durand
it controlled extraordinary assets to which other
airlines had no access, but thanks to its ability
to improve its capabilities faster than competi-
tors (Gittell, 2005). As the case of Southwest
Airlines further illustrates, capabilities emerge
from purposeful and collective learning processes
taking place as a firm’s members interact and
are motivated to look for new or better ways
to solve problems (Zollo and Winter, 2002).
This collective character protects capabilities
against imitation from competitors (Barney, 1991),
but implies that capabilities are neither simply
the result of corporate policies (Schreyögg and
Kliesch-Eberl, 2007) nor just the outcome of
individuals’ isolated actions (Vergne and Durand,
2011). They result from social interactions among
individuals, which are in turn shaped by these indi-
viduals’ motivation to invest in collective learning
processes.
Theories of capability development have so
far paid limited attention to human motivation
and social interactions. A variety of motivational
assumptions seems to implicitly coexist with
bounded rationality (Felin et al., 2012). However,
contributions to the resource-based view have
pointed out that motivational assumptions matter
to explain the emergence of firm-level outcomes
(e.g., Bridoux, Coeurderoy, and Durand, 2011;
Gottschalg and Zollo, 2007). Furthermore, despite
calls for theories of capability development con-
sidering social interactions (e.g., Barney and Felin,
2013; Coff and Kryscynski, 2011; Devinney, 2013;
Felin et al., 2012; Winter, 2013), the capability
view has so far focused on explanations at either the
organizational level (e.g., Kale and Singh, 2007;
Teece, 2007; Zollo and Winter, 2002) or the level
of individual managers (e.g., Helfat and Peteraf,
2015). In this article, we address these gaps by
explicitly taking into account motivational founda-
tions to analyze the development of capabilities and
the performance of the business process to which
these capabilities relate.
In line with most previous research on capabil-
ities (e.g., Helfat and Peteraf, 2003; Vergne and
Durand, 2011; Zollo and Winter, 2002), we adopt a
socio-evolutionary approach to capability develop-
ment: we investigate the nature of the social interac-
tions within groups that shape the variation, selec-
tion, and retention processes underlying the devel-
opment of capabilities by these groups. To develop
our theoretical model, we start with the literature in
behavioral economics and social psychology that
has studied the relationship between, on the one
hand, individuals’ motivation and cognition and, on
the other hand, individuals’ behavior in social inter-
actions, i.e., situations in which the outcome of an
individual’s behavior depends on others’ behavior
(e.g., De Cremer and Van Lange, 2001; Fehr and
Gächter, 2000; Simon, 1990, 1993). This literature
has uncovered heterogeneity in the motives driving
individuals’ behavior in social interactions and
distinguishes individualists from reciprocators: (1)
individualists’ behavior is primarily driven by the
pursuit of personal outcomes, which makes indi-
vidualists very responsive to monetary incentives,
while (2) reciprocators care about fairness and oth-
ers’ welfare in addition to their personal outcomes,
which makes their behavior very responsive to
motivational levers such as organizational justice
and social norms (Simon, 1990, 1993; Van Lange,
1999). Drawing on these findings, we relate the
composition of groups in terms of social motives
(the proportions of individualists and reciprocators)
to the variation-selection-retention stages of capa-
bility development and, subsequently, to business
process performance.
Our work makes three contributions. First, we
introduce microfoundations that help bridge multi-
ple levels of analysis relevant to strategy researchers
seeking to explain interfirm heterogeneity: our
foundations explain the social interactions at the
group level on the basis of the heterogeneity in moti-
vation at the individual level and the heterogene-
ity in motivational levers at the firm level. Second,
we identify three stylized paths along which capa-
bilities develop according to group composition.
Ceteris paribus, we argue that the trajectory of capa-
bility development differs across groups with dif-
ferent compositions: capability development paths
are the result of the social interactions at the group
level and emerge from individual-level motivational
and cognitive differences linked to social motives
in interplay with the organizational context. Conse-
quently, the paths can neither be explained by study-
ing the organizational context alone nor by look-
ing only at the motivation and cognition of indi-
viduals in isolation. Finally, linking the different
capability development paths to the performance of
the business process to which the capability relates,
we propose that homogeneous groups are better
at sustaining technical adequacy and evolutionary
adequacy in stable environments, whereas groups
counting a significant number of both individualists
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and reciprocators are better at adapting capabilities
to fast changing environments.
MOTIVATION IN SOCIAL
INTERACTIONS KEY TO CAPABILITY
DEVELOPMENT
Capabilities are distinct, patterned, and practiced
organizational activities (Helfat et al., 2007). These
are often large-scale, complex activities that have
a recognizable purpose in terms of the significant
outcomes that they are supposed to enable, like new
product development, customer relationships, sup-
ply chain and alliance management (Dosi, Nelson,
and Winter, 2000; Grant, 1996a; Kale and Singh,
2007; Schreyögg and Kliesch-Eberl, 2007; Trip-
sas and Gavetti, 2000). To qualify as a capability,
an activity must thus have been practiced enough
to work in a reliable manner (Helfat and Peteraf,
2003: 999). This implies that capability develop-
ment relies intensely on learning (e.g., Eisenhardt
and Martin, 2000; Gavetti, 2005; Helfat and Winter,
2011; Kale and Singh, 2007; Teece, 2007), espe-
cially deliberate learning (Dosi et al., 2000; Zollo
and Winter, 2002). For example, Kale, Dyer, and
Singh’s (2001) study of 200 organizations revealed
that prior alliance experience plays a relatively
minor role in the development of an alliance capa-
bility when it is not accompanied by deliberate
learning efforts.
In previous work on capability development the
locus of analysis is either the organizational level
(e.g., Kale and Singh, 2007; Teece, 2007; Zollo
and Winter, 2002) or the individual level (e.g.,
top manager: see Helfat and Peteraf, 2015; Teece,
2007). In contrast, the literature has been mostly
silent about social interactions, which link the
individual to the organizational level of analysis
and provide an “account of how the participating
individuals relate to each other—that is, of the
interpersonal or social aspects of behavior” (Winter,
2013: 133) (for an exception, see Kleinbaum and
Stuart, 2014). Early research viewed capabilities as
blocks of united actions that are repeatable, action-
able, and movable within the firm (e.g., Teece,
Pisano, and Shuen, 1997), being quasi-independent
from the organizational context and its members
(Helfat and Peteraf, 2003). Furthermore, at the
individual level of analysis, limited attention
has been paid to the motivation of individuals
throughout the organization (Gottschalg and Zollo,
2007), as most work has focused on managers’
cognition (e.g., Gavetti, 2005; Helfat and Peteraf,
2015; Hodgkinson and Healey, 2011; Tripsas and
Gavetti, 2000).
Yet, the more deliberate efforts at the basis of
the purposeful development of a capability require
individuals at the hierarchical level where the capa-
bility is employed to be motivated to act and learn
collectively. In large- and medium-sized organiza-
tions, the development of a capability is not simply
the result of (top) managers’ plans (Schreyögg and
Kliesch-Eberl, 2007), but is a bottom-up process
that requires deliberate efforts on the part of the
individuals employing the capability (Dosi et al.,
2000: 2; Grant, 1996b). Performing a capability
may be quite automatic, but its development is
“infused with intentionality, conscious deliberation,
planning, and expertise” even if intermittent and
fragmented (Dosi et al., 2000: 12).
For example, Kale and Singh’s work (Kale
and Singh, 2007; Kale et al., 2001) shows that
the development of an alliance capability relies
very heavily on alliance managers’ involvement in
activities such as knowledge sharing and coaching.
Furthermore, capability development is rarely,
if ever, an individual activity but usually results
from social interactions and crystallizes collective
learning (Grant, 1996a; Kogut and Zander, 1996).
Unless alliance managers participate in collective
activities to develop an alliance capability (such
as sharing alliance management know-how by
coaching managers who are new to alliances), the
knowledge they hold cannot be used by others
in the organization and is lost when they leave
the firm (Coff and Kryscynski, 2011; Kale et al.,
2001). Individuals may, however, not be motivated
to work closely with others to develop a capability.
They may, for example, be reluctant to share
knowledge because they view knowledge sharing
as personally more costly than beneficial (Husted
and Michailova, 2002) or because they feel threat-
ened by others’ negative feedback (Catmull and
Wallace, 2014).
Whereas the learning underpinning capability
development may not take place at the top of the
organization, but rather where the people perform-
ing the capability are located (Huy, 2011), top
managers do play an important role in facilitating
and guiding capability development. For example,
establishing a formal structure and systems to sup-
port the alliance managers’ learning leads to greater
alliance success (Kale and Singh, 2007; Kale et al.,
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2001) and Pixar’s CEO Ed Catmull considers it his
main job to create an organizational context where
social norms favor collective learning (Catmull and
Wallace, 2014).
Therefore, our theoretical model tries to explain
the development of a capability by a group of
individuals who interact in performing the capa-
bility (e.g., a group of technicians performing a
problem-solving capability) or because they have
been tasked to develop the capability (e.g., alliance
managers could be asked to form a task force
to improve the firm’s alliance capability). In the
former case, capability development is not the
primary goal of the group, but may be an impor-
tant secondary goal. Groups in our article cor-
respond to the persons interacting regularly and
relatively intensely in performing a task. As a
result, in large firms, several groups could develop
what is initially the same capability but one that
could eventually give rise to different capabil-
ities as a result of different social interactions
across groups.
We explain the social interactions underlying
capability development on the basis of individual-
level motivation and cognition in combination with
organizational-level motivational levers such as
monetary incentive systems and social norms. In
a first step, we draw on the large literature in
social psychology and behavioral economics about
social motives and patterns of social interactions.
In a second step, we build on this knowledge to
detail three stylized capability development paths
and their implications for business process perfor-
mance. With its focus on explaining social inter-
actions, our theoretical model complements other
approaches of capability development. The lit-
erature has pointed to a large number of fac-
tors influencing capability development, many of
which we simply assume constant in building our
theoretical model.
HETEROGENEOUS MOTIVES AND
BEHAVIOR IN SOCIAL INTERACTIONS
Human behavior in social interactions, in partic-
ular, in social dilemmas where personal interests
conflict with collective welfare (Van Lange et al.,
2013), has been studied extensively in social
psychology and behavioral economics. These
fields have generated a large body of empirical
evidence showing that an individual’s behavior
in social interactions can be explained by the
interplay between the individual’s social motive
and situation-specific factors (Bogaert, Boone, and
Declerck, 2008; Rusbult and Van Lange, 2003; Van
Lange et al., 2013), as pictured in Figure 1. While
researchers have used different labels to talk about
social motives (e.g., “social value orientations,”
“social preferences,” “self vs. other orientation”),
they all refer to individual differences in general
preferences for distributions of outcomes to self
and others in situations where these outcomes are
a function of both one’s own and others’ behavior
(e.g., De Cremer and Van Lange, 2001; Fehr and
Fischbacher, 2002). Social motives are personality
traits in the sense that they are stable over time
and not much affected by the dynamics of specific
social interactions (e.g., Eisenberg et al., 1999).
Individualists and reciprocators
Although many social motives exist, two social
motives in particular are widespread and especially
important in explaining individuals’ behavior and
the resulting collective outcome: individualism and
reciprocity. Individualism is the inclination to max-
imize one’s own outcome regardless of the outcome
for others (Fehr and Gächter, 2000). Individualists
are thus the self-interested individuals described
in traditional economics. Reciprocity is the incli-
nation to care positively for the others’ outcome
and to maximize joint outcome in interdependent
situations (i.e., behave prosocially), unless the inter-
dependent others fail to be cooperative or fair (Fehr
and Fischbacher, 2004; Kelley and Stahelski, 1970;
McClintock and Liebrand, 1988). In their review of
the psychology literature on social motives, Au and
Kwong (2004) report that most people are classified
as reciprocators (46%), but that individualists form
a significant minority (38%). In addition, if given
the opportunity, a large majority of reciprocators,
called “strong reciprocators,” are willing to bear a
personal cost (1) to reward those who cooperate or
are fair and (2) to punish those who do not cooperate
or are unfair (Fehr and Gächter, 2000). Strong recip-
rocators’ sanctions are not purely self-centered:
strong reciprocators are also willing to punish those
who behave unfairly toward or do not cooperate
with a third person they care about (Fehr and
Fischbacher, 2004). Sixty to 70 percent of all recip-
rocators are strong reciprocators on the basis of
studies of sanctioning by third parties (e.g., Fehr and
Fischbacher, 2004).
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Figure 1. Determinants of individual behavior in social interactions. Figure adapted from Bogaert et al. (2008: 455)
Reciprocators and individualists differ with
regard to their general willingness to cooperate.
Reciprocators are in general ready to cooperate
and are better “organizational citizens,” whereas
individualists have a tendency to behave in a more
selfish, competitive fashion (Rioux and Penner,
2001; Smeesters et al., 2003). Individualists and
reciprocators also hold different generalized expec-
tations regarding others’ cooperative behavior
because they judge what constitutes appropriate
behavior in social interactions on different grounds.
Reciprocators tend to judge behavior in terms of
morality (what is good or bad for the collective),
whereas individualists are inclined to interpret
behaviors along the effectiveness dimension (what
works, what improves personal outcomes) (De
Dreu and Boles, 1998; Liebrand et al., 1986).
As a result, reciprocators’ and individualists’
emotional reactions to others’ noncooperation
have different origins: reciprocators’ emotional
reactions arise from the violation of the fairness
norm, while individualists’ emotional reactions
arise from effectiveness concerns (Stouten, De
Cremer, and Van Dijk, 2005). In contrast to
reciprocators, individualists cease to be upset
when they learn that their personal outcome
will not be affected by others’ noncooperation
(Stouten et al., 2005).
Individualists’ and reciprocators’ cooperative
behavior
Social motives do not fully determine behavior;
they influence cooperative behaviors in interplay
with situational factors. Hence, individualists’
and reciprocators’ differences in terms of general
willingness to cooperate and generalized expec-
tations regarding others’ cooperative behavior do
not systematically translate into different behavior.
For example, both individualists and reciprocators
exhibit noncooperative behavior toward the end of
social dilemma experiments where participants are
not given the opportunity to punish noncooperators,
but individualists report that they do not cooperate
because they want to maximize their personal
outcome, while reciprocators stop cooperating as
their only way to retaliate against others’ noncoop-
eration (Fehr and Gächter, 2000; Ostrom, Walker,
and Gardner, 1992).
As shown in Figure 1, cooperative behavior
results from situation-specific cooperative goals
and expectations regarding others’ cooperative
behavior, which are in turn explained by the
interplay of the individual’s social motive with situ-
ational factors characterizing the social interaction
(Bogaert et al., 2008). In line with the literature
in management (e.g., Gottschalg and Zollo, 2007;
Ouchi, 1979), social psychologists and behavioral
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economists propose that monetary incentives to
cooperate and social norms are two key situational
factors explaining individuals’ cooperative behav-
ior. They add that these factors differentially affect
the situation-specific goals and expectations formed
by individualists and reciprocators because they
exhibit two fundamentally different approaches to
social interactions—based on personal outcome
for individualists and on conditional cooperation
for reciprocators (Bogaert et al., 2008).
With their tendency to focus on their personal
outcome, individualists cooperate strategically,
i.e., when the payoffs of cooperating are higher
than the costs (Van Lange, 1999). This implies that
monetary incentives aligning the pursuit of personal
outcome with the pursuit of the collective interest
can bring individualists to cooperate (arrow 1 in
Figure 1). For example, individualists respond posi-
tively to reputation incentives: they cooperate when
their reputation is at stake, but do not when their
reputation will not be damaged by noncooperation
(Declerck, Boone, and Kiyonari, 2014). Similarly,
in social dilemma experiments where partici-
pants can inflict sanctions, the financial sanctions
imposed by strong reciprocators on noncooperators
increase individualists’ cooperative behavior (Fehr
and Fischbacher, 2002; Fehr and Gächter, 2002).
By comparison, monetary incentives such as mone-
tary and reputation incentives have a much smaller
effect on reciprocators’ situation-specific coopera-
tive goal, because individual and collective interests
are more aligned for these individuals even in the
absence of monetary incentives (Boone, Declerck,
and Kiyonari, 2010; Declerck et al., 2014).
Reciprocators’ cooperation is conditional on
others’ cooperating too (Fehr and Fischbacher,
2004; McClintock and Liebrand, 1988); otherwise,
reciprocators’ general inclination to cooperate
would make them vulnerable to exploitation by
noncooperative others. As a result, reciprocators’
cooperation is very sensitive to how they expect
others to behave (Bogaert et al., 2008; De Cremer
and Van Lange, 2001). This explains why monetary
incentives can positively affect reciprocators’
cooperation when they reassure reciprocators that
individualists will cooperate (arrow 2). It also
explains why social norms, as “understood rules for
accepted and expected behavior” (Cialdini, Bator,
and Guadagno, 1999: 196), are a key moderator
of reciprocators’ cooperative behavior (arrow 3)
(Rusbult and Van Lange, 2003; Smeesters et al.,
2003), especially when reciprocators have limited
knowledge of others’ past behavior.
Compared to reciprocators, individualists’
cooperative behavior is much less influenced by
expectations about others’ cooperative behavior, in
general, and social norms, in particular (Smeesters
et al., 2003). This is consistent with the finding that
individualists do not cooperate when it does not
personally pay off to do so, regardless of others’
expected or actual strategy (Kelley and Stahelski,
1970; McClintock and Liebrand, 1988). However,
it does not mean that social norms never affect
individualists’ cooperative behavior: when individ-
ualists expect strong reciprocators to see coopera-
tion as the norm and thus to be inclined to punish
a lack of cooperation, they cooperate because the
threat of strong reciprocators’ punishment changes
their monetary incentives (arrow 4) (Fehr and
Fischbacher, 2002; Fehr and Gächter, 2002).
This difference in sensitivity to social norms cor-
responds to a major cognitive difference between
individualists and reciprocators and explains why
reciprocators are generally willing to cooperate.
Specifically, Simon (1990, 1993) suggests that
reciprocators are more apt to accept and act on
the social information captured by social norms.
Relying on social norms is beneficial as it helps
learn knowledge and skills that boundedly rational
individuals could not acquire independently, on the
basis of their own experience. However, at the same
time, relying on social norms brings reciprocators
to behave in ways that are beneficial for the col-
lective but personally costly, such as cooperating in
social dilemmas and enforcing cooperation in oth-
ers (Simon, 1990, 1993). Korsgaard, Meglino, and
Lester (1996, 1997) provided empirical evidence for
the link proposed by Simon: they showed that indi-
viduals concerned with the welfare of others—a
characteristic of reciprocators—are more respon-
sive to social norms than individualists.
Group composition and managerial levers
to guide deliberate capability development
The motivational and cognitive differences
between individualists and reciprocators explain
why a group’s social interactions are shaped by the
proportion of individualists and reciprocators in
the group, together with the organizational context
in which these interactions take place (Bridoux
et al., 2011). As the key actors in the creation of
the organizational context, managers are able to
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actively support capability development if they
use the adequate motivational levers given the
composition of the group (Bridoux et al., 2011).
For the sake of parsimony, we consider here three
types of group in terms of composition: mostly
individualists (hence, very few reciprocators),
mostly reciprocators (hence, very few individual-
ists), and a significant number of both individualists
and reciprocators.
Following the above discussion, for a group com-
posed mostly of individualists, monetary incen-
tives that reward individuals for their contributions
to capability development are the key managerial
lever for guiding capability development (Amabile,
1997). Designing monetary incentives can be tricky.
As Repenning and Sterman’s (2002) case study
illustrates, incentives aimed to encourage capability
development sometimes have the opposite effect.
For a group composed mostly of reciproca-
tors, the key managerial levers to guide capability
development are social norms supporting capabil-
ity development and perceptions of fairness. First,
managers can attempt to shape prevailing social
norms to make them supportive of capability devel-
opment, e.g., by formulating a vision for the firm
that emphasizes change, learning, and continuous
improvement (Chatman and Cha, 2003). Second,
managers should ensure perceptions of fairness
because reciprocators’ cooperative behavior is very
sensitive to their perceptions of organizational jus-
tice. If reciprocators feel that the firm and its man-
agers treat them fairly, they will be ready to reward
the firm by contributing to realizing its objectives
beyond what is personally rewarded. In contrast, if
reciprocators feel treated unfairly they will recip-
rocate by contributing little and strong reciproca-
tors may even punish the firm (Fehr and Gächter,
2000). Punishing the firm’s perceived unfairness
can take the form of lower productivity, less coop-
eration, theft, and lower product quality (Cowherd
and Levine, 1992; Greenberg, 1990; Pfeffer and
Langton, 1993).
Finally, for a group containing significant pro-
portions of both reciprocators and individualists,
managers should not only design monetary incen-
tives rewarding capability development (lever 1),
promote social norms supportive of learning and
change (lever 2), and ensure organizational justice
(lever 3), they should also put in place sanction
mechanisms that strong reciprocators can use
to discipline individualists (lever 4). Examples
of sanction mechanisms are: involving group
members in each other’s performance appraisals,
using team-based bonuses that group members
divide among themselves, and letting the group
select its members. When strong reciprocators are
unable to discipline individualists, individualists
will focus their efforts on the tasks that are rewarded
to the detriment of tasks that could contribute more
to the development of capabilities but are not
rewarded. Confronted with individualists’ limited
contribution to capability development, reciproca-
tors will stop contributing as a form of retaliation
(De Cremer and Van Lange, 2001; Liebrand et al.,
1986).
CAPABILITY DEVELOPMENT PATHS
Many authors have adopted a socio-evolutionary
approach to theorize about capability development
(Durand, 2006; Helfat and Peteraf, 2003; Zollo and
Winter, 2002). This approach relies on a conception
of organizations as selective environments, wherein
various action patterns emerge and are selected and
retained in the organization (Vergne and Durand,
2011). This variation-selection-retention model has
been largely applied at the industry–firm interface,
explaining which types of organizations tend to
survive (Aldrich and Ruef, 2006; Durand, 2006). In
the capability view, it has been used to explain the
deliberate learning and the associated knowledge
activities underlying capability development (e.g.,
Zollo and Winter, 2002).
In the variation stage, group members gener-
ate action patterns new to the group by mak-
ing new combinations, either by combining pieces
of the group’s existing knowledge in a novel
way or by combining pieces of the group’s exist-
ing knowledge with external stimuli that were
thus far not connected to them (Burgelman, 1991;
Kogut and Zander, 1992). These new combina-
tions form in the minds of individuals (Argote and
Miron-Spektor, 2011) but are fed by social inter-
actions. For example, social interactions provide
the forum for new combinations when individuals
share their knowledge and experiences and engage
in knowledge integration (Nonaka, 1994).
In the selection stage, some of the new action
patterns are eliminated, whereas others become can-
didates for retention (Aldrich, 1999; Durand, 2006)
on the basis of first an individual, then a collective
assessment of their potential. At the collective level,
the selection of new action patterns generated by the
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Figure 2. Variation-selection-retention stages and capability development path
group members and shared with the group involves
“a collective investment in articulation, analysis,
and debate of the merits and risks” connected to
them (Zollo and Winter, 2002: 343). According to
the strategy literature, the main selection criteria at
play are internal to the firm and linked, inter alia,
to social norms and monetary incentives (Aldrich,
1999: 26; Burgelman, 1991; Vergne and Durand,
2011), which are the very same situational factors
that social psychologists and behavioral economists
have found to affect behavior in social interactions.
Our microfoundations add to the strategy literature
that social norms and monetary incentives operate
differently as selection criteria according to group
composition.
Finally, to develop a capability, the new action
patterns that have been selected must be reused over
time and across space (Durand, 2006; Zollo and
Winter, 2002). In the retention stage, “selected vari-
ations are preserved, duplicated, or otherwise repro-
duced” (Aldrich, 1999: 30). A single instance of
successful problem-solving can trigger the develop-
ment of a capability, but it does not as such con-
stitute a capability unless this new pattern becomes
a habitualized one (Schreyögg and Kliesch-Eberl,
2007). Several knowledge activities contribute to
the group’s retention of new action patterns: the
codification of the new action patterns to store them
in organizational repositories such as rule books,
structures, best practices, and stories (Kale and
Singh, 2007; Levitt and March, 1988; Zollo and
Singh, 2004), the current group members’ internal-
ization and application of these patterns (Nonaka,
1994), the socialization or coaching of new group
members to retain the new action patterns in the
face of member turnover (Kale et al., 2001; Nonaka,
1994), and the diffusion of the new action patterns
to other places in the firm where they may be useful
(Trichterborn, Knyphausen-Aufseß, and Schweiger,
2016).
As shown in Figure 2, our goal is to investigate
how the social interactions among group members
shape these variation, selection, and retention
processes. We simplify reality and reason ceteris
paribus: we assume all factors to be the constant
across cases besides the proportion of individualists
to reciprocators in the group and the organizational
context—specifically, the four managerial levers.
Furthermore, we focus on the cases where the
organizational context is supportive of capability
development given the group composition. The
organizational context could be unsupportive
because managerial levers are not used in accor-
dance with the group composition (as described
above) or are primarily designed to encourage
the group to pursue another goal than capability
development (e.g., meeting short-run production
targets in Repenning and Sterman, 2002). If the
organizational context is not supportive, the group
will not develop capabilities to the same extent
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Table 1. Group composition and capability development paths
Group composition Variationa Selectiona Retentiona Path
Mostly
individualists
Low and local,
based on
individualists’
personal
experimentation
Action patterns
less new to the
group but
financially
rewarded are
preferred over
more novel ones
Low retention of
selected action
patterns, limited
to what is
rewarded
Convergence:
capability
development
guided by
monetary
rewards
Mostly
reciprocators
Medium, nurtured
by reciprocators’
sharing and
integrating their
knowledge
Action patterns
less new to the
group but
preserving social
cohesion are
preferred over
more novel ones
High retention of
selected action
patterns
Congruence:
capability
development
guided by social
norms
Significant
proportion of
individualists
and
reciprocators
High, coming from
the synthesis of
individualists’
personal
experimentation
and
reciprocators’
knowledge that
is enabled by
reciprocators
Application of
multiple
selection criteria
leads to greater
acceptance of
action patterns
newer to the
group
Medium, retention
level is higher
than in a group
composed
mostly of
individualists
but lower than in
a group of
reciprocators
Open-ended:
capability
development
guided by
monetary
rewards and
social norms
a By comparison with the other cases of group composition.
because individuals’ motivation is lower. Assuming
that the organizational context is supportive enables
us to reveal heterogeneity in capability develop-
ment paths and, thus, ultimately heterogeneity in
business process performance even among groups
whose members are motivated to develop capabili-
ties. Table 1 summarizes our discussion of the three
capability development paths corresponding to the
three main group compositions introduced earlier
(mostly individualists, mostly reciprocators, and a
significant number of both).
Path 1: convergence path
New combinations in a group of individualists come
first and foremost from personal experimentation
because of individualists’ cognitive makeup and
because of the dynamics in such a group. In general,
individualists rely more on personal experimen-
tation and less on vicarious learning than recipro-
cators (Simon, 1990, 1993). In addition, a group
composed mostly of individualists faces substantial
cognitive and motivational barriers to engage in
the knowledge activities supporting the genera-
tion of new combinations beyond what personal
experimentation allows. As individualists learn
more from personal experience, they have limited
information, heuristics, and meanings in common
to help them communicate. This lack of common
knowledge forms a cognitive hurdle to knowledge
sharing and integration (Grant, 1996a; Kogut and
Zander, 1992, 1996; Nonaka, 1994). Motivation
to share and integrate knowledge is also relatively
low in a group composed mostly of individualists
because individualists’ efforts are directed by mon-
etary incentives, which can only imperfectly reward
individuals’ contributions to knowledge activities
because these contributions are often difficult to
define ex ante, observe, and measure (Bartol and
Srivastava, 2002; Cabrera and Cabrera, 2002).
In the selection stage, individualists, who aim
to maximize their personal outcome and value
local efficiency at their level (De Dreu and Boles,
1998; Liebrand et al., 1986), tend to share new
action patterns with the group that they believe
will improve their personal cost–benefit balance,
by increasing their individual rewards for the same
investment of resources (e.g., their own time and
effort) or by saving on resources for the same
rewards. In other words, they tend to not voice new
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action patterns that came to their mind but that
are not serving their personal interests based on a
personal cost–benefit analysis, and so operating a
first selection at the individual level. For example,
observing a dysfunction in reporting errors, an
individualist may come up with an idea to fix this
problem, but may refrain from sharing the idea
because, in the absence of monetary incentives
rewarding improvements to the reporting system,
advocating the idea and developing the solution
would mean using one’s time inefficiently.
In turn, at the group level, among the new action
patterns generated by its members and shared with
the group, a group composed mostly of individual-
ists will select only the ones that gather support from
enough group members, which requires that enough
group members expect these new action patterns
to lead to a better personal cost–benefit balance.
Consequently, monetary incentives creating compe-
tition for rewards among group members foster the
status quo and are detrimental to capability devel-
opment. With such incentives, a new action pattern
serving the interests of one group member will hurt
the interests of other group members and be rejected
vigorously by these members. Individualists will
not hesitate to engage in overt conflicts to protect
their personal interests because they often see social
interactions in an economic context as means to an
end and even as competitive games in which per-
sonal success is the ultimate objective (De Dreu and
Carnevale, 2003). Even monetary incentives that do
not spur competition among group members and
align individual- and group-level interests encour-
age capability development in a specific direction.
The firm’s incentive system is usually fine-tuned to
reward action patterns that managers identified as
successful in the past (Gottschalg and Zollo, 2007).
As result, a group composed mostly of individu-
alists will tend to select action patterns that are in
line with past successes and to select out action pat-
terns that are very new to the firm and, consequently,
not (yet) rewarded by the incentive system, even if
group members recognize their superior potential to
improve the capability.
In the retention stage, not all the new action
patterns selected by the group are retained and
diffused. Retention involves costs that individuals
may be reluctant to incur (Levitt and March, 1988).
This barrier to retaining new action patterns is
especially relevant for a group of individualists. As
is the case for the knowledge activities related to
variation, individualists limit their retention efforts
to what is rewarded by the firm. So, for example,
individualists will only invest in knowledge cod-
ification to facilitate the group’s replication of
new action patterns over time (e.g., by develop-
ing recommendations, checklists, and templates;
Trichterborn et al., 2016) if the incentive system
rewards their codification efforts.
To sum up, in a group composed mostly of
individualists, the variation, selection, and retention
processes that constitute learning and the related
knowledge activities will be guided and constrained
by the system of monetary incentives. Individualists
will find new ways, primarily through personal
experimentation, to save on the resources they
deploy (e.g., own time and effort) in the pursuit
of action patterns and outcomes that are rewarded.
This will lead the group to develop a capability
along a path of growing efficiency in the use
of the firm’s existing resources to achieve the
objectives selected and rewarded by managers. We
label this path convergence, as the incentive system
put in place by managers enables the convergence
of individual and collective interests to support
capability development.
Path 2: congruence path
Capabilities will develop in a different direction
in groups composed mostly of reciprocators. If
they feel that the firm treats them fairly, which we
assume here, reciprocators are motivated to recipro-
cate the firm’s fairness by contributing to the firm’s
objectives beyond what pays off personally given
the incentive system in place (e.g., Fehr, Klein, and
Schmidt, 2007). Reciprocators are thus willing to
engage in collective knowledge activities even if
these activities are not or are only partly rewarded
by monetary incentives (Bridoux et al., 2011).
In the variation stage, the new combinations that
form in reciprocators’ minds build more on knowl-
edge acquired from others and less on knowledge
coming from personal experimentation than is the
case for individualists. Reciprocators’ concern for
others makes them more receptive to social norms
than individualists (Korsgaard et al., 1996, 1997;
Simon, 1990, 1993), more motivated and capa-
ble to take others’ perspective (Grant and Berry,
2011), and “understand, in a nonjudgmental way,
the thoughts, motives, and/or feelings of a target,
as well as why they think and/or feel the way
they do” (Parker, Atkins, and Axtell, 2008: 151).
Perspective taking is critical to social coordination
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and cooperation (see Galinsky, Ku, and Wang, 2005
for a review). At the individual level, thanks to
their capacity to take others’ perspective, reciproca-
tors are cognitively more able than individualists to
absorb the knowledge developed elsewhere in the
firm and to build on it to make new combinations
that can increase the utility of the capability for its
“users,” e.g., colleagues, managers, the firm, and
clients (cf., Grant and Berry, 2011). At the group
level, perspective taking and reliance on social
norms facilitate the collective knowledge activities
that are beneficial to the generation of new action
patterns, such as integrating knowledge. Members’
reliance on the same social norms and capacity
to take others’ perspective ease communication
among group members (Grant, 1996b; Kogut and
Zander, 1992; Nonaka, 1994) and foster the shar-
ing, discussion, and integration of viewpoints and
information (Hoever et al., 2012).
In the selection stage, social norms play a key
role. By defining what is appropriate, social norms
guide and constrain reciprocators’ selection of new
combinations (Miron-Spektor, Erez, and Naveh,
2011; Simon, 1990, 1993) both at the individual and
group levels. At the individual level, reciprocators’
selection is not driven exclusively by what is good
for them personally; when selecting which new
action patterns to share with the group, reciproca-
tors are more able and motivated to take others’
perspective in order to determine which new action
patterns are most useful in satisfying others’ needs
(De Dreu, Weingart, and Kwon, 2000; Grant and
Berry, 2011). Yet, reciprocators will not voice to
the rest of the group all new action patterns that
come to their mind and could better serve their
own or other’s interests; they will filter out the new
action patterns that, they fear, conflict with what
social norms prescribe as appropriate. Voicing new
action patterns that are potentially inappropriate
given the prevalent social norms puts one at risk
of being frowned upon and socially sanctioned by
strong reciprocators (e.g., being gossiped about
and isolated from the group), whereas voicing
concerns about new action patterns that threaten
the collective will be met with social approval.
Social approval matters more to reciprocators
than individualists; reciprocators want to be seen
as good relationship partners because they value
social relationships not only for the material ends
social interactions may help them achieve but also
for their own sake, even in an economic context
(Bridoux and Stoelhorst, 2014).
At the group level, the selection among the new
action patterns voiced by the group members is
similarly shaped by social norms, reinforcing the
selection effect of these norms. A group composed
of mostly reciprocators aspires to social cohesion:
it avoids conflicts in order to protect the social
relationships inside the group and between the
group and other parties from the damages conflicts
can cause to relationships (De Dreu and Carnevale,
2003). This preference for social cohesion hampers
the collective articulation, analysis, and debate of
the merits and risks of new action patterns. The few
very new action patterns voiced by group members
may be quickly discarded by the group as potential
threats to existing social relationships, because
adopting these new action patterns means changing
the interactions within the group and of the group
with other parties. In contrast, action patterns that
are less new but in line with prevalent social norms
form much less of a threat to social relationships
because they comply with the formal and informal
rules governing social interactions and can be
justified to the relational partners as appropriate
on the basis of these shared rules. As a result, and
because social norms reflect the knowledge that
has accumulated in the firm over time (Prahalad
and Bettis, 1986), relying on them as selection
criteria will make a group composed mostly of
reciprocators unlikely to adopt new action patterns
that diverge significantly from existing practices.
In the retention stage, the members of a group
of reciprocators will be willing to invest effort in
retaining the selected action patterns and sharing
them with other groups in the firm as a contribution
to the common good, even if retention activities
are not incentivized with monetary rewards. This
is especially the case if social norms encourage
the codification of knowledge and communication
activities within and across group boundaries.
To sum up, in a group composed mostly of
reciprocators, the variation, selection, and reten-
tion processes will be guided and constrained by
social norms. Reciprocators will find new ways to
better serve the needs of the actors who benefit
from capability development, including the orga-
nization itself, as long as these new action pat-
terns conform to social norms and are thus unlikely
to endanger social cohesion and existing relation-
ships. This will lead the group to learn and develop
capabilities along a path of growing utility for
the users of the capability under the guidance of
social norms. We label this path congruence, as the
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social cohesion that social norms enable supports a
capability development congruent with them.
Path 3: open-ended path
In a group containing a significant proportion of
both individualists and reciprocators, the variation
and selection processes at the individual level do
not differ from the ones described for the two
other profiles: reciprocators in the group generate
new combinations based on knowledge and expe-
riences accumulated in the firm, whereas individ-
ualists rely primarily on personal experimentation.
What is markedly different are the dynamics at the
group level. In the variation stage, the coexistence
of two types of members creates the cognitive and
motivational conditions conducive to greater variety
in new combinations than in homogeneous groups.
As reciprocators and individualists rely on differ-
ent information to generate new combinations, the
group has access to diverse perspectives. Diver-
sity in perspectives can increase collective learn-
ing because the synthesis of different perspectives
is superior to each of these perspectives taken sep-
arately; yet, this synthesis is not easy to realize
(Boland and Tenkasi, 1995; Kilduff, Angelmar, and
Mehra, 2000). Cognitively, this synthesis is pos-
sible in a mixed group thanks to reciprocators’
perspective-taking ability (Grant and Berry, 2011).
Perspective taking is important in a mixed group
because people high on this trait are better able to
frame messages so as to be understood by people
who have another viewpoint and to constructively
appraise the ideas of others, even if these others do
not share their values (Hoever et al., 2012).
Next to this role of cognitive facilitation, recip-
rocators also provide the motivational stimulant for
the exchange of ideas, the surfacing of assumptions,
and the integration of diverse perspectives and alter-
natives. As explained above, if, as we assume here,
a firm’s social norms promote change, learning, and
continuous improvement, strong reciprocators who
feel treated fairly by the firm are willing to disci-
pline individualists into contributing to knowledge
activities in order to help the firm achieve its objec-
tives and so reciprocate the firm’s fair treatment.
As a result, a group containing significant propor-
tions of both reciprocators and individualists is able
to sustain a level of knowledge sharing and inte-
gration comparable to a group composed mostly of
reciprocators if strong reciprocators have access to
sanctions (Bridoux et al., 2011).
In the selection stage, social norms are less
stringent selection forces in a group containing
significant proportions of both individualists and
reciprocators, than in a group composed mostly
of reciprocators. Strong reciprocators are likely
to enforce only what they perceive to be the most
important among the social norms, as it would be
very costly for strong reciprocators to monitor and
sanction individualists so as to get them to adhere
to the prevailing social norms in every aspect of
their behavior. This leaves room for individualists
to champion new action patterns that come from
personal experimentation and are not completely
aligned with the prevailing social norms, but that
they expect to lead to a better personal cost–benefit
balance given the firm’s incentive system. Con-
sequently, monetary incentives, as well as social
norms, guide the selection of new action patterns in
a mixed group; but both exercise weaker selection
pressure than in homogeneous groups. Finally, in
line with what we have argued for the variation
stage, retention is relatively high when strong recip-
rocators are motivated and able to compel individ-
ualists to contribute to these knowledge activities.
To sum up, in a group containing significant pro-
portions of both individualists and reciprocators, the
variation, selection, and retention processes will be
guided by monetary incentives and social norms,
but this guidance will be looser than is the case
in homogeneous groups. This creates room for the
generation, selection, and retention of more novel
action patterns, which makes the capability devel-
opment less predictable in terms of direction. Recip-
rocators’ pursuit of increasing utility for those who
benefit from the capability (e.g., clients, colleagues,
managers, and the firm) will be disrupted by indi-
vidualists’ pursuit of greater efficiency in the use of
resources. These efficiency gains, in turn, free up
resources that reciprocators can leverage to address
needs better. As a result, the capability development
path is open-ended, with more potential for radical
changes to capabilities than the other two paths.
IMPACT ON BUSINESS PROCESS
PERFORMANCE
We now relate the heterogeneity in capability devel-
opment paths stemming from group composition
to business process performance (see Table 2).
According to Ray, Barney, and Muhanna (2004), the
performance of the activity to which the capability
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Table 2. Consequences for management and business process performance
Consequences for business process performancea
Evolutionary adequacy
Group composition Path Managerial levers Technical adequacy
Stable
environment
Dynamic
environment
Mostly
individualists
Convergence Monetary
incentives
Steady increase:
the capability
becomes more
and more cost
effective
Potential for
sustained or
increasing
performance if
top-down
adaptation of
incentive system
Decreasing
performance
because
top-down
adaptation of
incentive system
is too slow
Mostly
reciprocators
Congruence Fairness and
social norms
Steady increase:
the capability
serves better and
better its
intended
function
Potential for
sustained or
increasing
performance if
adaptation of
social norms
Decreasing
performance
because the
adaptation of
social norms is
too slow
Significant
proportion of
individualists
and
reciprocators
Open-ended monetary
incentives,
fairness,
social norms,
and sanctions
Increase halted by
the adoption of
very new action
patterns
Performance is
jeopardized as
very new action
patterns give rise
to excessive
costs
Potential for
increase in
performance
thanks to very
new action
patterns
a By comparison with the other cases of group composition.
relates is the appropriate dependent variable to
examine the performance impact of capabilities.
Following Helfat et al. (2007), we consider both
the technical and the evolutionary adequacy of
the capability developed by the group1. Technical
adequacy refers to “how effectively the capabil-
ity performs its intended function when normalized
(divided) by its costs,” whereas evolutionary ade-
quacy “relates to how well the capability enables the
firm to make a living” (Helfat et al., 2007: 7).
On the basis of the capability development paths,
we can conclude that technical adequacy increases
faster when the capability is developed by a homo-
geneous group than by a group counting both a
significant proportion of individualists and recipro-
cators. A capability developed by a group composed
mostly of individualists will steadily become more
and more efficient in the use of resources along the
dimensions identified by management as enabling
success and duly incentivized. A capability devel-
oped by a group composed mostly of reciprocators
1 We prefer to use the term adequacy over that of “fitness”
used by Helfat et al. (2007) because fitness implies some ex
ante appreciation that the outcome associated with the actions is
necessarily positive (see Durand, 2006: 24).
will satisfy better and better the needs of the actors
who benefit from the capability (e.g., colleagues,
managers, the firm, and clients). By comparison,
the technical adequacy of a capability developed
by a group counting significant proportions of
both individualists and reciprocators will not
increase as steadily: it will halt and may even
decrease in periods where the group adopts very
new actions patterns, significantly reconfiguring
resources in attempts to pursue both efficiency in
the use of resources and utility for the users of
the capability.
Looking beyond technical adequacy, which is
defined internally, is important because the perfor-
mance of a business process eventually depends on
the nature of the external environment in which
the firm deploys this business process (Helfat et al.,
2007). A capability must not only be technically but
also evolutionarily adequate in the sense of provid-
ing a firm with a survival advantage and avoiding
a situation in which the firm is locked in a subopti-
mal state of affairs (Helfat et al., 2007; Teece, 2007;
Vergne and Durand, 2011) and is increasingly tied
to its the previous strategic choices, thereby making
it difficult to change strategic direction (Burgelman,
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2002: 326). Evolutionary adequacy depends in par-
ticular on the degree of environmental dynamism
(Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000). Some external envi-
ronments change slowly and predictably, whereas
others are characterized by shocks and dramatic
alterations.
The higher the environmental dynamism, the
quicker and more extensively a capability needs to
change in order for the business process to keep
performing at a satisfactory level. Specifically, evo-
lutionary adequacy depends on “quickly created
new knowledge and iterative execution to produce
adaptive but unpredictable outcomes” in highly
dynamic environments, while it depends exten-
sively on “existing knowledge and linear execution
to produce predictable outcomes” in more stable
environments (Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000: 1106).
Thus, small incremental changes to a capability
using the firm’s existing knowledge are enough
to maintain or enhance the value-creating poten-
tial of the capability in a more stable environment,
but more radical changes are needed in a more
dynamic environment. Group composition and the
social interactions it generates influence whether a
group is able to develop a capability to an extent and
with the speed that match the changes in the external
environment of the business process.
A group composed mostly of individualists is
unlikely to develop a capability quickly and exten-
sively enough to keep up with the changes char-
acterizing a highly dynamic environment. As long
as monetary incentives stay the same, the group
will keep pursuing the same objectives with lim-
ited regard for changes in the external environment.
This means that the capability will not be modi-
fied to match environmental changes unless man-
agers adapt the incentive system on time to reflect
those external changes2. Ensuring evolutionary ade-
quacy through a top-down alteration of the incentive
system is more feasible when the environment is
2 Pay-for-individual performance systems cannot automatically
reflect changes in the firm’s external environment. These systems
rely on managers translating the desired firm-level outcomes into
desirable individual-level outcomes or behaviors, which are then
measured and rewarded. In this translation process, even if they
aim to incentivize learning and innovation, managers are likely
to be biased toward past successes as illustrated by cases such
as Polaroid (Tripsas and Gavetti, 2000) and Intel (Burgelman,
2002). An alternative to “managerial translation” is a pay-for-firm
performance system, such as a profit-sharing plan. The advantage
is that firm performance is directly linked to the firm’s changing
environment. The disadvantage, however, is that, unless the firm
is very small, individualists would shirk with a pay-for-firm
performance system as it creates a social dilemma.
changing slowly because incentives cannot be con-
stantly revised without the firm incurring high costs,
such as the opportunity costs of managerial atten-
tion that could go to other activities (Baker, Jensen,
and Murphy, 1988) and a loss in productivity as
employees need time to learn to be productive under
a new incentive regime (Obloj and Sengul, 2012).
By comparison, reciprocators are more likely
than individualists to perceive when the activity is
at odds with external needs because they are bet-
ter at taking others’ perspective (De Dreu et al.,
2000; Grant and Berry, 2011). In other words, the
sensing capacity described by Teece (2007) is com-
paratively more the forte of reciprocators than of
individualists. In addition, if they feel that they are
treated fairly reciprocators are willing to partici-
pate in adapting the capability to changing external
demands, even if participating does not benefit them
personally. This implies that with a group com-
posed mostly of reciprocators a capability could be
adapted over time from the bottom up, with only
limited managerial intervention. Yet, this bottom-up
adaptation will be relatively slow because capability
development is constrained by the maintenance of
social cohesion under the guidance of social norms.
Given that social norms change slowly, it follows
that it takes time for very new action patterns to
become socially acceptable and thus no longer form
a threat to social cohesion (e.g., Ostrom, 1990).
Thus, in a highly dynamic environment, a group
composed mostly of reciprocators is unlikely to
develop the capability fast enough for the activity
to keep performing satisfactorily.
A group containing a significant number of
both reciprocators and individualists has the poten-
tial to change a capability faster than either type
of homogeneous groups. Reciprocators provide
knowledge about the changes in external demands
and strong reciprocators can enforce participation
in the knowledge activities needed to develop the
capability. The presence of individualists, in turn,
increases the diversity of new action patterns the
group can select from. Furthermore, the internal
selection criteria are looser, creating more space for
action patterns that are very new to the firm. This
supports evolutionary adequacy in a highly dynamic
environment. In contrast, in a stable environment,
changes in the capability are likely to be more exten-
sive than needed, hurting the performance of the
business process because they give rise to additional
costs. For instance, more extensive changes require
larger investments of employees’ effort and time in
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the knowledge activities supporting deliberate capa-
bility development, to the detriment of deploying
the group’s existing capabilities to create value in
the business process.
DISCUSSION
Theoretical contributions
Many of the organizational phenomena that inter-
est strategy scholars are the result of social interac-
tions rather than of independent individual actions.
Consequently, it is important for strategy research
to avoid the pitfall of extreme methodological indi-
vidualism whereby researchers attempt to explain
social phenomena in terms of individuals alone, as
if individuals’ decisions and actions occurred in iso-
lation from group life (Hodgson, 2007) and as if a
group behaved like a single and (most often than not
in prior research) benevolent individual. By build-
ing on the very rich literature in social psychology
and behavioral economics that has studied individu-
als’ decisions and actions in social interactions, our
article introduces microfoundations that avoid the
pitfall of methodological individualism and enable
multilevel theorizing for strategy research aiming to
explain interfirm heterogeneity.
A second contribution of our article is to use these
microfoundations to analyze the variation, selec-
tion, and retention processes that underlie deliberate
capability development by a group of employees.
We have first argued that the levers managers should
use to guide deliberate capability development dif-
fer as a function of group composition because indi-
vidualists and reciprocators respond differently to
the organizational context. We have also argued
that group composition in terms of social motives
helps explain heterogeneity in capability develop-
ment paths. This heterogeneity is not only quantita-
tive, with some groups developing capabilities more
than others because of an organizational context that
matches better group composition, but also qualita-
tive, with groups developing capabilities in different
directions even if they are relatively equally moti-
vated. As such, our multilevel theorizing comple-
ments existing work on the sources of performance
heterogeneity: the heterogeneity of the resources
and capabilities that are built in firms emerges, at
least in part, from motivational and cognitive het-
erogeneity at the individual level, in conjunction
with heterogeneity in managerial levers at the orga-
nizational level.
Third, by linking the internal heterogene-
ity in capability development to environmental
dynamism, our article contributes an original
perspective on the underpinnings of organizational
evolution and performance. Whereas traditional
evolutionary perspectives start with variation as
given and selection as external to entities (Aldrich
and Ruef, 2006; Durand, 2006), we propose an
in-depth explanation of the processes of variation
and selection at the entity level (here the group),
what can be considered the “raw material” of
evolutionary perspectives. Tracing relationships
between sub-entity characteristics, both in terms
of cognition and motivation of individuals, on
the one hand, and the relative adequacy to the
selective environment of the capabilities emerging
at the group level (from the interactions among
these sub-entities), on the other hand, provides an
interesting avenue for researching the endogenous
determinants of organizational performance.
Managerial relevance
Our work points to different channels through
which managers can affect capability development
if the pursuit of other objectives does not com-
pletely constrain their choices. In the shorter term,
by emphasizing some managerial levers over oth-
ers as a function of the composition of the firm’s
current workforce, managers can increase group
members’ motivation to invest in capability devel-
opment. More importantly, our work invites man-
agers to not only think in terms of more or less
capability development, but also in terms of capa-
bility development path(s): the path(s) groups in the
firm are currently engaged in and the one(s) that are
desirable given the firm’s objectives and the nature
of the environment(s) the firm faces in deploying
its business processes. The convergence path cor-
responds to the traditional case of the organization
using monetary incentives to align the employees’
interests with those of the firm. Many not-for-profit
organizations espouse the congruence path with a
vast majority of employees motivated by a social
mission (e.g., poverty reduction). And, we observe
the open-ended path in some professional service
firms that pursue goals related to different logics
simultaneously (e.g., healthcare organizations that
have health-related and financial objectives).
In the longer term, managers can influence the
capability development path of a group by manag-
ing its composition. Indeed, group composition is
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partially under managers’ control through selection
and self-selection mechanisms (Bridoux and Stoel-
horst, 2014; Coff and Kryscynski, 2011). Managers
can select and retain employees on the basis of their
social motives (a selection effect). For example,
Southwest Airlines is careful to screen prospective
employees based on their attitudes more than their
skills in order to select applicants who will cooper-
ate with others to get the work done (Gittell, 2005).
In addition, Southwest’s managers are attentive to
correcting potential hiring mistakes: new hires who
do not adopt Southwest’s teamwork approach are
either fired or counseled out (Gittell, 2005). Man-
agers can also influence the capability development
path through employees’ self-selection. Managers’
emphasis on some of the levers described above
makes the firm more or less attractive to individuals
depending on their motives (Bridoux et al., 2011).
For example, a strong emphasis on individual mon-
etary incentives is more attractive to individualists
and a strong emphasis on fairness is more attractive
to reciprocators, which connects capability devel-
opment paths with compensation policies.
Future research
As a first attempt to shed light on the social
interactions underlying capability development,
our ambition was to pave the way for future devel-
opments that together will enable us to integrate
motivation and social interactions to the same
extent as cognition in our strategy theories. Many
other factors, which we have assumed constant in
our analysis, deserve attention in future research
as they are likely to influence deliberate capability
development by affecting the nature of the social
interactions in a group. First, heterogeneity in
the experience or functional background of group
members could benefit deliberate capability devel-
opment through an increase in variation, but at
the same time this heterogeneity engenders social
interactions characterized by heightened task and
relational conflict, which are known to hurt group
performance (De Dreu and Weingart, 2003). In the
same vein, future research could address the influ-
ence of (formal and informal) leaders on the social
interactions in groups of different composition in
terms of social motives. We would expect effective
leadership to take quite a different form depending
on group composition. Finally, managers outside
of the group can play a role in capability develop-
ment that goes beyond shaping the organizational
context: they may feed the variation stage (e.g.,
by imposing the adoption of a new IT system) and
be personally involved in selecting the new action
patterns championed by the group.
In conclusion, our objective has been to connect
the literature on capability development to the
existing research on the heterogeneity of social
motives in order to uncover how group composition
in terms of the proportions of individualists and
reciprocators influences the capability development
process (variation, selection, and retention), and
to outline the consequences for the management
of capability development and business process
performance.
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